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This Article addresses a paradox in American healthcaretechnology: a thriving
market for generic drugs but a paucity of generic medical devices. Despite the
@ 2020 Zachary E. Shapiro, Adam Pan, Keturah James, Megan S. Wright & Joseph J. Fins.
Zachary E. Shapiro, J.D., MSc., is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Division of Medical Ethics at
Weill Cornell Medical College. He also holds an appointment as a Research Fellow at the Solomon
Center for Health Law and Policy at Yale Law School, where his scholarship supports the Consortium

for the Advanced Study of Brain Injury at Yale Law School (CASBI@YLS). He is the Co-Chair of
the Hospital Ethics Committee at The Rockefeller University in New York City. After graduating
from Harvard Law School cum laude in 2016, Shapiro served as the Presidential Scholar of Law at the
Hastings Center Bioethics Research Institute and as a Fellow at the Massachusetts General Hospital's
Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior. In 2017, he clerked for the Honorable Judge Timothy B. Dyk on
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C. Shapiro received his MSc. from the
London School of Economics and Political Science.

***

Adam Pan, J.D., Ph.D., is a legal advisor to the Honorable Judge Timothy B. Dyk. He

received his B.A.Sc. in engineering science from the University of Toronto and his Ph.D. in medical
engineering and medical physics from MIT. Adam attended Yale Law School, where he served as
Editor-in-Chief for the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics and the Yale Journal of Law
and Technology.
**** Keturah James graduated from Yale Law School in 2019, where she worked as an Articles
Editor for the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics and the Yale Journal of Law and
Technology. She currently works at Jenner & Block in New York. Keturah received her B.A. in
Psychology with a concentration in Neuroscience from Yale College.
***** Professor Megan S. Wright, J.D., Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Law, Medicine, and
Sociology at Penn State Law and the Departments of Humanities and Public Health Science at Penn
State College of Medicine, as well as an affiliate faculty member with the Department of Sociology
and Criminology and the Rock Ethics Institute in the College of the Liberal Arts at the Pennsylvania
State University. She is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Medical Ethics in Medicine at Weill
Cornell Medical College. Prior to her appointment at Penn State, Professor Wright was a Postdoctoral
Associate of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell Medical College. Concurrently, she served as a Research
Fellow and Senior Adviser to the Consortium for the Advanced Study of Brain Injury Project at the
Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy at Yale Law School. Prior to earning her J.D., Professor
Wright served as a Law and Social Science Research Fellow at the James E. Rogers College of Law
and as a qualitative analyst at the Southwest Institute for Research on Women, both at the University
of Arizona. Professor Wright earned a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Arizona.

******

Joseph J. Fins, M.D., M.A.C.P., F.R.C.P. is the E. William Davis, Jr., M.D. Professor of
Medical Ethics and Chief of the Division of Medical Ethics at Weill Cornell Medical College, where
he is a Tenured Professor of Medicine, Professor of Medical Ethics in Neurology, Professor of Medical

596

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

success of generic pharmaceuticals in reducing healthcare costs, no analogous
market existsfor generic medical devices. This plays a part in keeping prices high
while limiting access to affordable therapies. In this Article, we highlight the
regulatory and legal barriers currently impeding the development of a generic
medical device market in the United States. We explore differences between
generic drugs and generic devices in FDA regulation, products liability, and
patentability,all of which contribute to the absence of medical devices in clinical
practice. We conclude with recommendations to foster more widespread
development of generic medical devices.
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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A GENERIC MEDICAL DEVICE MARKET

In 2016, eighty-nine percent of prescription drugs dispensed in the United
States were generic pharmaceuticals.' Once the patent on an innovator drug
expires, competitors can develop and sell lower-cost, generic versions of the
drug. Generic pharmaceuticals provide a multitude of benefits. The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") has acknowledged that the availability of
generic drugs is the primary driver for reducing drug prices, and the use of
generic alternatives to name brand pharmaceuticals has saved the U.S.
healthcare system nearly $1.5 trillion over the past ten years. 2 Furthermore, the
marketplace for generic drugs allows manufacturers to adopt pharmaceuticals
after the original innovator-drug manufacturer has exited the market but while
the drugs still provide significant clinical benefits to patients. Indeed, generic
drugs may be the only option for patients who rely on a particular
pharmaceutical if the original drug manufacturer has exited the market.
Despite the success of the generic drug market, no analogous generic
market currently exists for high-risk medical devices. Instead, significant
regulatory and legal barriers continue to hamper the development of, and limit
access to, generic medical devices, especially risky devices that would be
classified as Class III.' At the same time, the medical device market accounts

1.

OFF. OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2016 OGD ANNUAL REPORT 2

(Jan. 2017).
2. Id.; see also Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1993, 1993 (2007) (noting that the expansion of generic drugs has been linked to a tempering of price
increases for prescription drugs); Charles B. Holmes et al., Use of Generic AntiretroviralAgents and Cost

Savings in PEPFAR Treatment Programs, 304 JAMA 313, 313 (2010) (discussing the FDA's use of a

&

premarket generic drug approval mechanism for reducing the cost of antiretroviral drugs); Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of PrescriptionDrugs in the United States,
316 JAMA 858, 861 (2016) ("The only form of competition that consistently and substantially decreases
prescription drug prices occurs with the availability of generic drugs, which emerge after the monopoly
period ends.").
3. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fins, Devices, Drugs, and Difference: Deep Brain Stimulation and the Advent of
Personalized Medicine, in HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS 607, 607-18 (Jens Clausen & Neil Levy eds.,
2015) (explaining regulatory challenges faced in the medical device industry); see also Joseph J. Fins
Nicholas D. Schiff, Conflicts of Interest in Deep Brain Stimulation Research and the Ethics of Transparency,
21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 125, 127-28 (2010) (discussing personal experiences and difficulties in
developing a Class III medical device). Class I medical devices are those devices that have a low to
moderate risk to the patient and/or user, such as elastic bandages, tongue depressors, manual
stethoscopes, and bedpans. Class II medical devices have a moderate to high risk to the patient and
include powered wheelchairs and some pregnancy test kits. Class III medical devices have a high risk
to the patient and include cardiac pacemakers, deep brain stimulation probes and electrodes, and hip
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for a significant segment of healthcare expenditures, with net sales of $136
billion in 2014.4 Patented devices make up a substantial portion of the U.S.
medical device market. For example, for over a decade Mylan held a dominant
share of the epinephrine autoinjector market, at around ninety-five percent of
the market share. Only recently have other generic manufacturers been able to
capture more than single-digit percentages of the medical device market.'
Currently, there are fields of medicine where generic medical devices
simply do not exist. For instance, in the fields of neuroscience and
neurosurgery,' essential tools of treatment and discovery such as
neuroprosthetics and deep brain stimulation ("DBS") implants and electrodes
exist only as innovator medical devices-there are no generic devices available.
Patients and doctors thus have little choice but to use branded devices that are
tightly controlled by the manufacturers and, given their exclusivity in the field,
expensive. Not only does this mean that there are many types of medical devices
for which there is no downward pricing pressure, but the lack of generic devices
also restricts access to medical devices for patient therapy because patients
simply cannot afford them. This can make translation of discoveries from the
lab ultimately less accessible at the bedside.
While the absence of a broad generic device market keeps prices high, it
also means that many medical devices face little generic competition. If generic
versions of medical devices were more readily available, distributive justice
concerns related to access could be ameliorated. Manufacturers would have an
incentive to allow access to medical devices for investigational purposes because
there might be a market downstream to justify the initial capital investment.
This would mean that the knowledge generated by medical devices could be
more widely developed and disseminated.

implants. For an in-depth discussion of different categories of medical devices, see discussion infra
Section II.A.
4. U.S. GOvT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-635R, MEDICAL DEVICE COMPANIES:
TRENDS IN REPORTED NET SALES AND PROFITS BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 5 (2015).
5. Chelsea Rice, PrescriptionsJump for EpiPen Alternatives, ATHENA INSIGHT (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.athenahealth.com/insight/sites/insight/files/3.03%20Prescriptions%20jump%20for%20E
piPen%20alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/52ZM-59BB].

6. See id.
7. See generally JOSEPH J. FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND: BRAIN INJURY, ETHICS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS (2015) (providing an overview of ethical, medical, and legal issues
that arise when considering patients with disorders of consciousness and severe brain injury).
8. In this Article, the term "innovator device" refers to a patented device that is first to market.
This terminology mirrors that used by the FDA referring to patented drugs as "innovator drugs,"
sometimes also referred to as "brand-name drugs." In contrast, "generic devices" are unpatented devices
that are based on an innovator device predicate, again mirroring the terminology of "generic drugs."
9. We do not mean to imply that generic devices should be used in clinical research. Rather, we
suggest that a generic market would help catalyze research that might not otherwise occur.

2020]
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For patients, lower costs would allow cutting-edge medical devices to be
more widely available. Increased access to low-cost medical devices should have
a positive impact on public health by allowing greater utilization of medical
devices to improve the health of those who need them. Access issues create a
strong, independent ethical argument for greater availability of generic medical
devices beyond the expected economic benefits that generic devices could bring
to the healthcare system by lowering healthcare costs. The law is an excellent
way to shift incentives in this marketplace, and thus lawyers have a role to play
in advancing public health by helping shift society towards the widespread use
of generics. However, currently, the generic device market is nearly nonexistent
for many medical devices, limiting interest in initial investment in novel
therapeutics with small market shares.n
One reason for the lack of success of generic medical device manufacturers
is that they are not afforded the same level of regulatory and legal protection
that generic drug manufacturers receive. This is particularly problematic for the
makers of Class III devices, which come with a troubling safety profile due to
their high-risk nature. Indeed, the FDA does not provide a classification for
"generic medical devices" like it does for generic drugs. Furthermore, while
courts have been willing to extend to generic devices certain patent protections
available for generic drugs, Congress and the courts have provided divergent
regulatory systems for medical devices and prescription drugs in terms of
products liability.12 This Article will analyze potential regulatory and legal
drivers for a generic device market, explore how generic drugs and generic
devices are treated differently, and offer recommendations for expanding the
generic medical device market.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I highlights the benefits of
generic medical devices, from both an ethical and economic perspective that is
focused on access, before discussing why generic devices cannot be expected to
provide the exact same fiscal advantages to the healthcare system as generic
drugs. Part II examines regulatory differences, products liability, and
patentability issues in order to highlight the disparity between generic drugs

10. See Zachary E. Shapiro, Field Notes: Bioethics in the Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb.
2017, at inside front cover (highlighting the law's role in supporting science, such as determining
qualifications for disability benefits, overseeing clinical trial protocols, and patenting new medical
devices).

11. See Fins & Schiff, supra note 3, at 125-26 (highlighting the difficulty in obtaining funding for
medical research into deep brain stimulation).

12. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 634 (2011) ("Notably, although Congress
enacted an express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976, it included no such provision in
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments eight years later." (citing Act of May 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295,

§ 521,

90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C.

§ 360k(a)

(2018)))); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567

(2009) ("[W]hen Congress enacted an express pre-emption provision for medical devices in 1976, . ..
it declined to enact such a provision for prescription drugs." (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2018))).
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and devices. Part III argues that regulatory and legal protections available to
generic drugs should be extended to generic medical devices so that generic
devices can be properly incentivized and more widely employed. To this end,
the Article closes with a series of proposals and recommendations designed to
better incentivize the development of generic medical devices. Our goal is to
enable greater access to medical devices, ultimately improving care and
reducing healthcare system costs.
I. CONSIDERING BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF GENERIC DEVICES
The disparate treatment of generic medical devices and generic drugs
results in a severely diminished market for generic medical devices. The absence
of generic medical devices contributes to high prices because there is simply no
viable alternative for cost-conscious patients. The lack of competition is
especially stark when considering higher-risk medical devices, such as Class II
and Class III devices," where there is little to no generic competition. This part
first discusses anticipated benefits of a generic medical device market before
discussing its limitations.
A.

Anticipated Benefits

The lack of generic medical devices creates a market inefficiency-one
that, if addressed, could realize many of the same benefits to patients, doctors,
and the healthcare system as generic drugs do. Beyond economic inefficiency,
the absence of generic devices presents an ethical dilemma. Because access to
many medical devices is restricted, the branded devices remain expensive,
maintaining a corporate monopoly and ultimately restricting access for both
patients and doctors. This makes it more burdensome, and in some cases
impossible, for individuals to utilize devices that could improve their health.
The obvious benefit of a generic medical device market-beyond
promoting greater access to generic devices-would be to lower healthcare costs
associated with medical devices. Lowering the cost of generic medical devices
would improve access, allowing such devices to be utilized more broadly by both
doctors and patients once research has been completed.14
13. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
14. Of course, increasing access to generic devices is by no means the only way to make cuttingedge medical devices more available. For instance, one of the authors has proposed deferring the

intellectual property ("IP") rights provided by the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2018)). See Joseph J. Fins, Deep Brain
Stimulation, Free Markets and the Scientific Commons: Is It Time To Revisit the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980?, 13
NEUROMODULATION 153, 156-57 (2010). The suggestion involves delaying IP transfer "until Phase
II studies are ready to commence," allowing the federal government and private actors to jointly fund
Phase I trials of medical devices. Id. at 156. This would allow the investigators most familiar with the
work to shepherd their studies through pivotal early stages of research, without having to place a market
valuation on their ideas. Id. Doing so would avoid financial conflicts of interest that often disqualify
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There is a strong ethical argument to be made for increasing access to
generic medical devices." Many doctors are sensitive to treatment costs and
often consider price as a factor when making medical recommendations." While
medical devices can provide genuine therapeutic benefits, the cost they impose
on patients and healthcare systems can be significant." Given that expense is
one of the most significant downsides to employing medical devices, generic
medical devices are well positioned to effectively reduce healthcare costs and
expand access to medical devices by introducing competition and driving down
the price in otherwise stagnant device sectors.
There are numerous examples of the significant cost savings generated by
generic medical devices. For instance, one generic medical device, a Universal
Sling System for female urinary incontinence, was reported to potentially save
hospitals twenty-five to fifty percent in cost as compared to its name brand
counterparts.18 One Texas hospital allegedly saw savings of $44,000 in a single
year after switching to the generic Universal Sling System." Another example
comes from the rise of generic asthma inhalers. After generic asthma inhalers
became available, from the mid-2000s through the end of 2008, ninety-six
percent of the fifty million chlorofluorocarbon albuterol inhalers consumed
were generic.20
More recently, the FDA approved a generic alternative to EpiPen and
EpiPen Jr. (epinephrine) autoinjectors for the emergency treatment of allergic

even the best-qualified investigators from formative research. Id.; see also Fins & Schiff, supra note 3,

at 130.
15. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fins et al., Ethical Guidancefor the Management of Conflicts of Interest for
Researchers, Engineers and Clinicians Engaged in the Development of Therapeutic Deep Brain Stimulation, J.
NEURAL ENGINEERING, May 10, 2011, at 1, 2 ("Investigators should not be driven by self-interest . .
but rather motivated by a desire to pursue important scientific work to enhance access to novel
interventions.").
16. Andrew Pollack, Cost of Treatment May Influence Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/treatment-cost-could-influence-doctors-advice.html
[https://perma.cc/2MZQ-T4VC (dark archive)].
17. See Chuck Dinerstein, An Overlooked Health Care Cost - The Medical Device Market, AM.
COUNCIL SCI. & HEALTH (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.acsh.org/news/2018/10/03/overlooked-healthcare-cost-medical-device-market-13468 [https://perma.cc/G3WK-H84R] (discussing the revolution in
vascular surgery heralded by the stent while acknowledging its cost); Katherine Hobson, Cost of
Medicine: Are High-Tech Medical Devices and Treatments Always Worth It?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(July 10, 2009), https://health.usnews.com/health-news/best-hospitals/articles/2009/07/10/cost-ofmedicine-are-high-tech-medical-devices-and-treatments-always-worth-it
[https://perma.cc/Q8RV7B5Z] (discussing "technology creep" as a major driver of increasing healthcare costs).
18. Laura Ruth, The FutureofDevices Is Generic, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Sept.
23, 2011), https://www.mddionline.com/future-devices-generic [https://perma.cc/N6FS-3XLL].

19.

Id.

20.

Use of Ozone-Depleting Substances; Remove of Essential-Use Designations, 70 Fed. Reg.

17,168, 17,185 (Apr. 4, 2005) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R.

§ 2.125

(2019)).
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reactions.21 The high cost and lack of an accessible generic device had received
widespread media attention and even prompted congressional intervention.22
Already, there are reports of reduced costs to patients, with costs falling from
$600 for the nongeneric autoinjector to as little as $10 for the generic
alternative.23 Some studies show that, in a pharmaceutical context, more than
one generic manufacturer needs to be involved to reduce long-term costs.24 That
is all the more reason, however, to expand the market of generic medical devices
to cover Class II and Class III devices, to create downward pressure on price.
By lowering costs, increased access to generic medical devices will promote
public health through the widespread implementation of effective and lifechanging therapies. Lowering the price of the medical device through use of
generics enables more patients to employ the device. In this way, there is a
public health argument to be made for greater access to generic devices,25 as
expanded access can result in greater availability of medical care. Research
shows that high costs of healthcare can deter patients from complying with, or
seeking, proper medical treatment.26 This imposes a cost not only on individuals
but also on the healthcare system as a whole. It is well established that delaying
treatment can lead to worsening conditions that ultimately result in more costly
emergency room visits.27 Having less expensive generic medical device
alternatives available for a wider range of procedures will reduce the financial
burden of medical devices generally, allowing more individuals to access the

&

21. FDA Approves First Generic Version ofEpiPen, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 16, 2008),
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm617173.htm
[https://perma.cc/92SN-Z8AM].
22. Dan Mangan, Congress Will Hold a Hearing on Mylan's Big EpiPen Settlement with Justice
Department, CNBC (Oct. 27, 2016, 11:23 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/27/congress-will-holda-hearing-on-mylans-big-epipen-settlement-with-j ustice-department.html
[https://perma.cc/N6FS3XLL].
23. See Ginger Skinner, The EpiPen Alternative That Costs Just $10, CONSUMER REP. (Feb. 3,
2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/epipen-alternative-that-costs-just-10-dollars/
[https://perma.cc/SFP3-CYTW].
24. See Jonathan D. Alpern & William M. Stauffer, Does a Generic EpiPen Mean Lower Prices?
Don't Hold Your Breath, STAT (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/09/07/generic-epipenteva-lower-prices/ [https://perma.cc/KQ2B-U2K4].
25. See generally Christine M. Baugh & Zachary E. Shapiro, Concussions and Youth Football: Using
a Public Health Law Framework To Head-Offa PotentialPublic Health Crisis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 449
(2015) (explaining how law can look to public health research and theory in order to help design better
legal systems and interventions to improve public health).
26. See, e.g., Trent Gillies, Why Health Care Costs Are Making Consumers More Afraid ofMedical
Bills than an Actual Illness, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/22/whyhealth-care-costs-are-making-consumers-more-afraid-of-medical-bills-than-an-actual-illness. html
[https://perma.cc/2W4V-JT9T].
27. See Aurel 0. luga & Maura J. McGuire, Adherence and Health Care Costs, 7 RISK MGMT.
HEALTHCARE POL'Y 35, 36-37 (2014) (addressing the impact of nonadherence to pharmaceutical
prescriptions on overall healthcare costs); Sarah Kliff, Emergency Rooms Are Monopolies. Patients Pay the
Price., VOX (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2017/12/4/16679686/
emergency-room-facility-fee-monopolies [https://perma.cc/GV2A-D2BB].
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care they need and, ideally, increasing compliance with care instructions. This
should have the result of reducing healthcare system costs, even beyond what
simply lowering device prices might suggest.28
Furthermore, a robust generic device market would encourage companies
to support broader research with their devices by reducing barriers to entry in
the medical device market, such as costs of regulatory compliance and market
risk. This would expand the marketplace for all devices. Device manufacturers
would understand that the best avenue for increased market share would come
through eventually working with a generic device company or even producing
generic devices themselves. Currently unprofitable devices could become
feasible once the longer life of the generic market is taken into account,
especially if a manufacturer could project revenue from developing licensing
agreements and collecting royalty fees from future generic device sales.
Furthermore, there is always the opportunity for joint-business ventures where
innovators pair with generic companies.
A generic device marketplace could help incentivize the creation of new
medical devices that might not have been feasible to fund before. This longersustained market share, coupled with the potential of licensing fees and royalties
once generic devices begin to enter the market, would help create markets for
ideas that might otherwise not get funded or supported by industry. Expansion
of the medical device market should spur increased use of devices in research,
as device makers recognize a wider market and thus erect fewer barriers for
researchers.
A wider market would not be the only benefit for device manufacturers.
Greater access to generic devices could also improve patient safety and data
collection. Access to generic devices should allow a larger, more diverse patient
population to use a particular device. In Phase IV (postmarket) trials, the larger
patient population would increase the potential for aftermarket data gathering.
The data would be correspondingly more robust because more individuals than
before would be able to use the device, so there would be a more heterogeneous
patient population. This should result in improved longitudinal data, helping
improve efficacy and safety for both branded and subsequent generic medical
devices.29 As a result, device manufacturers would be able to more accurately
recognize defects or problems in their devices, deficits that can go unnoticed

28. See Brian P. Wallenfelt, Hatch- Waxman and Medical Devices, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1407, 1416, 1420, 1422 (2014) (explaining the benefits of a competitive medical device market and the
significance of reducing the cost of creating medical devices due to the financial burden of
manufacturing such goods).
29. See Xinji Zhang et al., Overview of Phase IV Clinical Trials for Postmarket Drug Safety
Surveillance: A Status Report from the ClinicalTrials.govRegistry, 6 BMJ OPEN 11, e10643 (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5168517/ [https://perma.cc/RL8D-6PH7] (arguing
that a large sample size for Phase IV medical drug trials is imperative to ensure patient safety).
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when devices are used in a smaller patient population. Moreover, these larger
patient populations may demonstrate degrees of efficacy in subpopulations not
previously discernable with smaller samples.
B.

Limitations

While there are many potential benefits to increasing use of generic
devices, generic devices cannot be expected to have exactly the same benefits as
generic drugs. Indeed, we recognize that, compared to generic pharmaceuticals,
generic devices are less likely to be as widely adopted or as effective at lowering
prices. For instance, given the practical and financial difficulties associated with
building many cutting-edge devices, not all medical devices will be good
candidates for generic alternatives. This is particularly true with riskier and
more technologically complex medical devices." Many of these devices rely on
closely protected external algorithms and monitoring devices in addition to the
sophisticated, often proprietary, hardware of the device itself. These devices
require updates to their operating system and firmware, and some will require
regular maintenance. Building generic equivalents to such devices could prove
difficult and costly given the secrecy with which many companies protect their
medical device blueprints and specifications." Even with significant reverse
engineering and testing, creating a line of generic devices may be too
burdensome and too expensive for many device manufacturers.
There is also the natural concern that, as medical understanding and
technology evolve, many medical devices may quickly become obsolete as newer
and more effective devices replace them. For some devices, it will be hard for
generic device manufacturers to keep up, making investment unlikely even if
those devices are afforded greater legal and regulatory protections. These
concerns would particularly impact generic medical devices for higher-risk
procedures, which rely on advanced technology and need to remain on the
cutting edge of development. For these devices, it may never make sense for a
generic manufacturer to invest the time, expense, and resources needed to
eventually bring the generic device to market. However, there is no reason that
30. See, e.g., Gary Marcus & Christof Koch, The Future of Brain Implants, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14,
2014,
7:30
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-future-of-brain-implants-1394839583
[https://perma.cc/E6CS-B6VQ (dark archive)]; Mike Vintges, ICD ManufacturersMust IncreaseBattery
Life To Cut Costs, Improve Care, DIAGNOSTIC & INTERVENTIONAL CARDIOLOGY (July 31, 2012),
https://www.dicardiology.com/article/icd-manufacturers-must-increase-battery-life-cut-costsimprove-care [https://perma.cc/RA8P-7MYW] (describing the risks associated with changing out
pacemakers when their batteries run out). These particular cutting-edge Class III devices-implantable
pacemakers and neuroimplants-are just two examples of devices that might not be ideal candidates
for generic alternatives.
31. See Emma Dolan, Price Variation and Confidentiality in the Marketfor Medical Devices, HEALTH
CARE BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2012/02/14/deja-vu-all-over-againprice-variation-and-confidentiality-in-the-market-for-medical-devices/
[https://perma.cc/TM6G5KSR].
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generic devices could not meet a safe and effective minimal standard for various
other applications.
It is possible that pricing benefits of generic devices may not be as
apparent, and therefore persuasive, to doctors as they are with generic drugs.
Studies show that price transparency of medical devices is limited, and many
doctors simply do not know how expensive the medical devices they use are.32
One study found that attending physicians correctly estimated the cost of the
medical device only twenty-one percent of the time, and residents did so only
seventeen percent of the time." Costs for these devices are often embedded in
complex hospital bills and/or intermingled with operative costs, making
itemization difficult for the doctor or consumer to discern. Accordingly, it is
impossible to expect the same level of broad cost reduction, or immediate
significant uptick in the use of generic devices, as occurred with generic drugs.
There is also limited data available concerning how broadly employed
generic medical devices would be compared to innovator counterparts. Indeed,
there are still groups of patients who are resistant to the use of generic
pharmaceuticals due to mostly unfounded concerns about inferior quality.34
This perception may also be present for generic medical devices, limiting their
ability to serve as a true replacement for many high-risk medical devices.
However, just as consumer fears have not severely reduced usage of generic
pharmaceuticals, 5 these issues very well may not significantly hamper the
uptake of generic medical devices.
Additionally, several mechanisms exist to ensure that generic medical
devices will produce a high-quality product that adheres to basic manufacturing
quality standards. First, as with drugs, the FDA requires all device
manufacturers to comply with the Good Manufacturing Practice ("GMP")
regulations. 6 Failure to comply with GMP can result in enforcement action by
the FDA, including civil penalties and device recalls." Second, according to at

32. See, e.g., John Tozzi, What's a New Hip Cost? Surgeons Have No Idea, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 27, 2014, at 28, 28.
33.

Kanu Okike et al., Survey Finds Few Orthopedic Surgeons Know the Costs of the Devices They

Implant, 33 HEALTH AFF. 103, 105 (2014).
34. See Alice losifescu et al., Beliefs About Generic Drugs Among Elderly Adults in Hospital-Based
Primary Care Practices, 73 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 377, 381-82 (2008).
35.

Mohamed A.A. Hassali et al., Consumers'Views on Generic Medicines: A Review ofthe Literature,

17 INT'LJ. PHARMACY PRAC. 79, 87 (2009) (concluding that patient knowledge and confidence about
generic medicines have steadily increased since the 1970s).
36. 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1, 820.5 (2019).
37. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), (g), 333(f)(1)(A) (2018); see also CPG Sec. 390.300 Assessment of Civil
Penalties Against Manufacturers and Importers of Electronic Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr.
https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/
2005),
ucm073913.htm [https://perma.cc/6EJ2-5ZU9]; What Is a Medical Device Recall?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/medical-device-recalls/what-medicaldevice-recall [https://perma.cc/J4FJ-34NW].
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least one circuit court, federal preemption does not shield generic
manufacturers from state-law tort claims if such claims lie in a manufacturing
defect. In Bass v. Stryker Corp.," the plaintiff, who received an artificial hip
implant from the defendant and was subsequently injured due to his implant,
filed an action for state-law tort claims." The district court found that his claims
were preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360k.4 0 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that,
while some of the plaintiffs claims were preempted, any manufacturing defects
that resulted from violations of the FDA's GMP regulations were not
preempted by federal law.41 The court further held that the plaintiffs claims
were also not preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 337(a),42 which provides that "all such
proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this Act .

.

. shall

43

be by and in the name of the United States." The court held that this did not
prohibit state-law tort claims, which were distinguished from a "freestanding
federal cause of action based on violation of the FDA's regulations." 44 Thus, the
court held that the plaintiffs claims based on manufacturing defects survived
federal preemption.45 This prospect of expanded liability is a good incentive for
device makers to enact extra precautions in the manufacturing and production
process.

While there are unknowns about how broadly employed generic devices
will be, these unanswered questions should not deter us from trying to reap the
potential benefits discussed above. Indeed, some of the concerns discussed
previously, such as questions about safety and uptake in use, were also raised
about generic drugs, especially when generics were first beginning to enter the
market and compete with trusted and well-known branded pharmaceuticals.46
However, the history of generic drugs and the current effects of the few existing
generic devices highlight opportunities for addressing the systemic need for
lower-cost generic alternatives for medical devices.
The lack of generic devices in the market presents a particular problem for
neuroscientists, especially those who rely on Class III devices for which there
are few generic alternatives. Indeed, device manufacturers' failure to pursue the

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 513-14.
21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2018).
Bass, 669 F.3d at 514.
Id. at 514, 518.

46.

See generally Jaime R. Hornecker, Generic Drugs: History, Approval Process, and Current

Challenges, 34 U.S. PHARMACIST (GENERIC DRUG REV.) 26, 26-27, 30 (2009) (describing the history
of the rise and eventual acceptance of the generic drug industry).
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development and marketing of generic devices runs the risk of
disproportionately disadvantaging fields of medical and scientific inquiry that
depend on medical devices, such as neuroscience. While the exact benefits of
greater access to generic devices might be unknown, the potential for reduced
cost, combined with increased accessibility and wider use, are too important to
simply ignore.
II. REGULATORY AND LEGAL OBSTACLES FOR GENERIC DEVICES

Currently, the regulatory and legal system treats generic drugs and generic
devices very differently. The result of these differences is that generic drugs are
afforded a range of regulatory and legal protections that are not available to
generic medical devices. This has stymied the development and production of
generic medical devices, thus depriving society of the potential benefits of
greater use of generic devices. This part first describes how the FDA approval
process differs for drugs and devices, leading to a generic drug market but not
a generic device market. Then, it describes how products liability jurisprudence
may discourage prospective generic device manufacturers from entering the
market. Next, it discusses patentability issues for generic drugs and generic
devices. It concludes by considering what effect the regulatory and legal
treatment of generic devices has had on the market.
A.

FDA Approval Process

To understand the current regulatory scheme for generic medical devices,
it is useful to compare the approval process of devices with that of generic
pharmaceuticals.
All drugs and devices have to receive approval from the FDA prior to
being marketed. As both the oldest and most comprehensive consumer
protection agency in the United States, the FDA was initially conceived as the
Bureau of Chemistry by Congress with the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and
Drugs Act.47 It was not until three decades later that the FDA, as we know it,
was brought into existence by the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA").48 The FDCA was later amended by numerous acts of Congress,
including the 1976 Medical Device Amendments Act,49 the 1990 Safe Medical
Devices Act," the 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act,"

47. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
48. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i (2018)).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379-379a,
and 42 U.S.C. § 3512 (2018)).
50. Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.).
51. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.).
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the 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act,52 the 2012 Food and
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act," and the 2016 21st Century
Cures Act.54
The FDA has broad authority concerning the regulation of food, drugs,
and medical devices. Under section 201(g) of the FDCA, drugs are defined as
including any "articles [including any component of an article] intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals" as well as "articles [including any component of an article] (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals."" Courts, experts, and FDA officials have recognized that the
definition of the word "drug" is intended to be expansive and a "purposefully
broad delegation of discretionary powers by Congress."" Under section 201(h)
of the FDCA, the definition for "device" includes any
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is ... intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals
and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement
of its primary intended purposes.

52. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.).
53. Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42
U.S.C.).
55. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 2 01(g), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(g) (2018)).
56. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

§ 6:1

(2d ed. 2005); see FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 164-65 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing
a detailed review of the legislative history of the definition of "drug" in the FDCA); A Bill To Prevent
the Manufacture, Shipment, and Sale of Adulterated or Misbranded Food, Drink, Drugs, and Cosmetics, and
To Regulate Traffic Therein; To Prevent the False Advertisement of Food, Drink, Drugs, and Cosmetics; and
for Other Purposes: Hearingson S. 2800 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 516 (1934) (statement
of Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the FDA), reprinted in 2 FDA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 519 (1979) ("This definition
of 'drugs' is all-inclusive."); A Bill To Prevent the Manufacture, Shipment, and Sale of Adulterated or
Misbranded Food, Drink, Drugs, and Cosmetics, and To Regulate Traffic Therein; To Prevent the False
Advertisement of Food, Drink, Drugs, and Cosmetics; andfor Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 1944 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 15-16 (1933) (statement of Walter G. Campbell,

Chief of the FDA), reprinted in 1 FDA,supra,at 107-08 (discussing the "inclusive[,] . .
of the word "drug").

57. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

§ 201(h),

21 U.S.C.

§ 321(h)

(2018).

wide definition"
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The modern definition of device explicitly disclaims software related to medical
decisionmaking." The similarity in the language used to define "drugs" and
"devices" has long been recognized by courts as a clear indicator of Congress's
intent for the definition of "devices" to be just as all-encompassing as the
definition of "drugs."5 9

1. Dual Regulatory Pathways for Drugs and Devices
Through the FDCA and its amendments, Congress has directed the FDA
to create separate pathways for the regulation of drugs and medical devices.
Pursuant to this mission, the FDA has established the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research ("CDER") to regulate drugs 0 and the Center for
Devices and Radiological Health ("CDRH") to regulate devices. 1
CDER regulates based on three major categories: (1) "new" drugs; (2)
generic drugs; and (3) over-the-counter ("OTC") drugs. Like the definition of
"drug," the definition of "new drug" is expansive and includes any drug not
generally recognized as safe ("GRAS")62 or safe for its intended use. Many
litigants have tried and failed to restrict this definition of "new drug," such as
in the context of restricting "new" intended uses to only curable diseases,64

58. See id. ("The term 'device' does not include software functions excluded pursuant to section
360j(o) of this title."); id. § 360j(o) (excluding software that provides administrative support for
healthcare facilities; maintains or encourages healthy lifestyles; serves electronic patient records; or
transfers, stores, converts, or displays laboratory test data).

59. United States v. An Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) ("The historical
expansion of the definition of drug, and the creation of a parallel concept of devices, clearly show, we
think, that Congress fully intended that the Act's coverage be as broad as its literal language indicatesand equally clearly, broader than any strict medical definition might otherwise allow.").
60. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 28, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/center-drug-evaluation-and-research-cder

[https://perma.cc/9TQ8-UN7Q].
61. Center for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 12, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/office-medical-products-and-tobacco/center-devices-and-radiological-

health [https://perma.cc/95VQ-E4JP].
62. "Generally Recognized As Safe" is a term of art that has largely fallen out of usage in the
modern drug approval context and is only invoked when the FDA regulates food additives or
ingredients. See Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GRAS/ [https://perma.cc/7368-WM72].

63.
64.

21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(p)(1).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551 (1979) ("The Federal Food, Drug, and

Cosmetic Act makes no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients.").
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restricting it to only finished products and not ingredients," or even to resolve
cases on the margin of whether a particular drug constitutes a "new drug.""
If CDER determines that a proposed drug product is a "new drug," the
drugmaker must apply for an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application
consisting of the proposed clinical testing that will demonstrate that the drug is
both safe and effective as required by the FDCA.67 Approval of the IND
application authorizes the drugmaker to perform the required clinical testing."
The drugmaker may then submit a new drug application ("NDA") containing
"full reports" of the results of the investigation demonstrating whether the drug
is both "safe" and "effective" for its intended use. 9 If the FDA approves the
NDA, the applicant is then authorized to market the drug. For manufacturers,
the approval of a new drug is costly, time-consuming, and risky.
CDHR, in contrast, classifies devices based on risk categories: low-risk
devices ("Class I"), moderate-risk devices ("Class II"), and high-risk devices
("Class II").72 Unlike drugs, medical devices are typically not classified
according to whether they are "new" medical devices. Instead, under the riskbased classification, regulatory approval is gated by "General Controls,"
"Special Controls," and "Premarket Approval."" Furthermore, "[r]egulatory
control increases from Class I to Class III."74 General controls refer to
regulatory requirements under the FDCA, which provide basic reporting,"

65. See Pharmanex v. Shalala, 221 F.3d 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to restrict the
definition of "new drug" within 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(3)(B) to only finished products on the grounds of
the "broad terminology" Congress used to craft the provision, and finding that this ambiguity merited
Chevron deference to the FDA's interpretation of the term "new drug").

66.

Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973) ("We do not

accept the invitation to hold that FDA has no jurisdiction to determine whether a particular drug is a
'new drug' and to decide whether an NDA should be withdrawn.").

67. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(d)

(2018) (outlining the grounds for refusing drug applications, including

if the drug is unsafe or ineffective).

68. See § 355(i); 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2019).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
70. Id.
71. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (estimating
the cost of developing a new drug at $2 to 3 billion).

72. Classify

Your Medical Device,

U.S.

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.

(Aug.

31, 2018),

https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/classifyyourdevice/ucm2

005371.htm [https://perma.cc/ZAQ3-XRXL].
73. Id.
74. Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug.
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/overview/default.htm

[https://perma.cc/AGQ6-UEGA].
75. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2018).

31,

2018),
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labeling," and notification requirements" to which all medical devices must
conform.
2. Accelerated Pathways
In addition to standard approval pathways, the FDA offers accelerated
approval pathways for both drugs and devices. These pathways are available to
classes of drugs and devices that are based on an approved predicate, with
requirements for predicate drugs being different from predicate devices.
The FDA codifies the approval process for new generic drugs in its
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA")." Through ANDA, generic
manufacturers are able to circumvent the time-consuming and expensive NDA
process." While an NDA requires significant preclinical and clinical data to
establish safety and effectiveness," an ANDA requires only that manufacturers
demonstrate bioequivalence of the generic version of the drug to the predicate
innovator drug." The ANDA does not require the applicant to obtain any
agreements from the original innovator drug manufacturer (i.e., rights of
reference for the safety and efficacy data) as the safety and efficacy of the drug
are presumptive once bioequivalence is proven.82 As a result, generic
manufacturers are able to bring generic drugs to market at a significantly lower
investment cost than their innovator counterparts." Furthermore, the ANDA
process ensures that the generic drug applicant is bioequivalent to a drug that
has already been approved by the FDA. This requirement ensures that drugs
approved through the ANDA process are therapeutically equivalent to drugs
that are already on the market. The FDA gives significant guidance on the
standards that a drug manufacturer must meet to establish bioequivalence.84
On the other hand, since the FDA does not specifically recognize generic
medical devices, there is no abbreviated approval process for generic medical
76.

Id.

§ 352.

77. Id. § 360h.
78. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.92-99 (2019); see Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (May 22, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-newdrug-application-anda [https://perma.cc/T22G-ZJ7J].
79. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50-.90 (2019); see New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (June 10, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsare
developedandapproved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/
EZ8M-DLSP].
80. See New Drug Application (NDA), supra note 79.
81. See Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), supra note 78.
82. See id. With respect to drugs, "[r]ight of reference or use is the authority to rely upon, and
otherwise use, an investigation for the purpose of obtaining approval of an NDA, including the ability
to make available the underlying raw data from the investigation for FDA audit, if necessary." 21
C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019).
83. See Kesselheim et al., supra note 2, at 861.
84. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 320.21-38 (2019) (outlining the procedures for determining the
bioavailability or bioequivalence of drug products).
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devices. Instead, device approvals are based on two criteria. First, the FDA
categorizes the device under one of the three risk categories described earlier:
Class I (low risk), Class II (moderate or controlled risk), or Class III (high
risk)." Then, the FDA determines if a predicate or substantially equivalent
device currently exists on the market.
For devices that carry low to moderate risk, and for which a substantially
equivalent predicate exists, the FDA allows for an approval process known as a
section 510(k) clearance." Under this approval process, the manufacturer only
needs to demonstrate substantial equivalence to a device already placed into one
of the three classification categories." However, unlike the ANDA, eligibility
for the section 510(k) process is also based on the risk associated with the device
and not solely on whether a predicate exists." Therefore, most high-risk medical
devices are precluded from the fast-track 510(k) approval process."
Class III devices typically require Premarket Approval ("PMA")." Under
the PMA process, a device manufacturer must demonstrate a "reasonable
assurance" of the safety and efficacy of the proposed device, usually through
clinical data." As a result, high-risk medical devices, such as deep brain
stimulation probes, can only be brought to market by manufacturers capable of
investing significant capital into getting PMA for their device.
Some high-risk devices currently qualify for an alternate expedited
approval pathway known as the Humanitarian Device Exemption ("HDE").
However, this pathway is limited to rare diseases, and there are problems with

85. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2018); see also Medical Device Overview, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/industry/regulated-products/medical-device-overview
[https://perma.cc/D3KS-SHX8].
86. See 510(k)
Clearances, U.S.
FOOD
& DRUG
ADMIN.
(Sept.
4,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/DeviceApprovalsandClearance
s/510kClearances/ [https://perma.cc/UC9J-F7D8]. For certain low-risk Class I devices, the FDA may
exempt the device entirely from premarket approval. See Class I / II Exemptions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (July 1, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-your-medical-device/class-i-iiexemptions [https://perma.cc/B6SB-T9GF].
87. See 510(k) Clearances,supra note 86.
88. See id.
89. See Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 16, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-pma
[https://perma.cc/BD3Q-44WC] ("Due to the level of risk associated with Class III devices, FDA has
determined that general and special controls alone are insufficient to assure the safety and effectiveness
of Class III devices.").
90. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2018); see also PremarketApproval (PMA), supra note 89.
91. § 360c(a)(1)(C); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.1-84 (2019) (outlining regulations that govern the
PMA process).
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the HDE pathway.92 These include the potential for misuse of the HDE`
combined with the fact that the "less rigorous HDE process need not
demonstrate efficacy,"94 making the HDE poorly suited as a mechanism to
reliably bring generic medical devices to the market in a safe and responsible
manner. The HDE regime is wholly unlike the NDA and ANDA, which allow
for expedited-but scientifically rigorous-approvals of life-saving medications
such as cancer drugs" and HIV antiretroviral medications."
There are other significant problems with the device approval process.
Since the section 510(k) process does not require therapeutic equivalence,
defined as when two interventions have the exact same clinical effect and safety
profile, manufacturers are allowed to circumvent the PMA process if they
submit a series of section 510(k) applications, each making a small change from
the previous model. Several critics of the section 510(k) process have analyzed
this effect, showing that only a small percentage of devices approved through
this process were supported by scientific evidence of any kind." Thus, instead
of promoting widespread adoption of proven technology, the current section

92.

21 U.S.C.

§ 360j(m)

(2018); see also Joseph J. Fins et al., Misuse of the FDA's Humanitarian

Device Exemption in Deep Brain Stimulation for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 30 HEALTH AFF. 302,

303-05 (2011) [hereinafter Fins et al., Misuse of HDE] (arguing that applying an HDE to deep brain
stimulation to study obsessive-compulsive disorder potentially undermines enrollment in randomized
clinical trials utilizing an HDE); HumanitarianDevice Exemption, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept.
5, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/
premarketsubmissions/humanitariandeviceexemption/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2KYC-RQD5].
93. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fins & Zachary E. Shapiro, Deep Brain Stimulation, Brain Maps and
Personalized Medicine: Lessonsfrom the Human Genome Project,27 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY 55, 58-59 (2014)
(explaining that use of DBS electrodes originally developed to treat Parkinson's in the treatment of
obsessive-compulsive disorder constituted a misuse of the HDE process).
94. Joseph J. Fins, Gary S. Dorfman & Joseph J. Pancrazio, Challenges to Deep Brain Stimulation:
A PragmaticResponse to Ethical, Fiscal, and Regulatory Concerns, 1265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 80, 84
(2012) [hereinafter Fins et al., PragmaticResponse].
95. Dominique Lev~que, Generic Drugs in Oncology, 18 LANCET ONCOLOGY e63, e63 (Feb. 2017),
http://thelancet.com/journals/lanonc/article/PIIS1470-2045(17)30033-5/fulltext
[https://perma.cc/

ZW7G-JBXU].
96. See, e.g., AntiretroviralDrugs Used in the Treatment of HIV Infection, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (May 14, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/hiv-treatment/antiretroviral-drugs-usedtreatment-hiv-infection [https://perma.cc/9EQG-ZKAK] (compiling all the approved generic versions
of HIV antiretroviral medications).
97. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS 29-31 (Theresa Wizemann ed., 2010); Elisabeth M. Dietrich & Joshua
M. Sharfstein, Improving Medical Device Regulation: A Work in Progress, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED.

1779, 1779-80 (2014); Josh Rising & Ben Moscovitch, Opinion, The Food and Drug Administration's
Unique Device Identification System: Better Postmarket Data on the Safety and Effectiveness of Medical

Devices, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1719, 1719-20 (2014); Diana Zuckerman, Paul Brown & Aditi
Das, Lack of Publicly Available Scientific Evidence on the Safety and Effectiveness of Implanted Medical
Devices, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1781, 1781 (2014) ("Despite the legal requirement that scientific
evidence of scientific equivalence be publicly available for medical devices by the FDA through the
510(k) process, such information is lacking for most implanted medical devices cleared between 2008
and 2012, as well as for their predicates.").
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510(k) process incentivizes innovators to make small, incremental
improvements to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. These product
evolutions are subject to only weak standards, enabling "predicate creep": where
an FDA-approved section 510(k) device, as a result of many minor changes over
time, evolves to the point that it "can be made from different materials, use
different power sources, and have indications for different anatomical sites.""
A solution to this problem must address the issues discussed above.
Attempting to include all high-risk devices under the current section 510(k)
process would lead to more potentially harmful predicate creep, and the goal of
incentivizing a generic marketplace-and de-incentivizing incremental
stagnation-is best achieved by requiring therapeutic equivalence.
B.

Products Liability

In the field of products liability, Congress and the courts have significantly
diverged in their treatment of drug products and medical devices. While the
general underlying principles of products liability apply to both categories of
products, the courts' treatment of generic drugs has conferred significant
advantages that medical device manufacturers do not enjoy.
The landmark cases for generic drug products liability are PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing" and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett.' In Mensing, plaintiffs
brought several state tort actions against generic drug manufacturers for failure
to provide adequate warning labels for generic versions of metoclopramide, a
drug used to treat gastroesophageal diseases."o' The defendant drug
manufacturers argued that under federal statutes and FDA regulations, it was
impossible for a generic manufacturer to unilaterally amend warning labels,
which are set by the innovator manufacturer of a drug, in accordance with state
law requirements.102 Under the impossibility preemption doctrine, state law
needed to give way to federal law when the defendants could not
"independently do under federal law what state law requires of it.""' The
Supreme Court agreed with the defendants and held that generic drug
manufacturers could not be found liable under state tort law for failing to
provide adequate warning labels. 104
In Bartlett, a case about a generic drug that caused a life-threatening skin
disorder in an individual, resulting in her losing sixty percent of her skin,

98. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE REGEN MENAFLEX
https://www.fda.gov/media/77734/download [https://perma.cc/7PBT-4E73].
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

564 U.S. 604 (2011).
570 U.S. 472 (2013).
See PLIVA, Inc., 564 U.S. at 609-10.
See id. at 610.
See id. at 620.
See id. at 624.

3

(2009),
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preemption and design defects were considered after a failure-to-warn claim
Ultimately, the Court was faced with an allegation of design
was dismissed.
defect, a different species of products liability tort."' Rejecting the plaintiffs
argument that the drug manufacturer could simply "stop selling" the accused
product to comply with both federal and state law, the Court applied Mensing
and extended impossibility preemption to generic drug design defects."'
Mensing and Bartlett were decided in the aftermath of the Court's prior
holding in Wyeth v. Levine."' In Wyeth, the Court held that innovator drug
manufacturers were required to comply with both federal and state labeling
requirements and declined to find impossibility preemption."' In that decision,
the Court found that while labeling changes typically required drug
manufacturers to obtain FDA approval, an innovator drug manufacturer could
"add or strengthen" portions of the label related to "safe use of the drug
product" through the FDA's "changes being effected" regulation.no The Court
held that because it was "physically possible" for Wyeth to have complied with
both federal and state law," impossibility preemption would not result. 2
After Mensing and Bartlett, generic drug manufacturers may only be found
liable for drug manufacturing defects and not for product design defects or
failure to warn. Some liability is essential, as there are still instances of poor
manufacturing practice and negligence by generic drug manufacturers,. and
patients harmed by these actions need a legal mechanism for recovery.
However, in an industry where nearly one-third of all drug products result in
postmarket safety events,1 4 protection against certain forms of liability is an
important, and perhaps essential, incentive for generic drug manufacturers.
Weighed against the high cost of drug products liability, where drug
manufacturers often pay millions in damages and settlements for failure-to-

105. Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 478-79.
106. Id. at 479.
107. See id. at 488-89.
108. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
109. Id. at 581.
110. Id. at 568.
111. Id. at 591 (Thomas, J., concurring). Despite the fact that Wyeth could have amended the label
without FDA approval, the risk was high. If the FDA found that Wyeth's amended label was "false or
misleading," it could withdraw approval for Wyeth's drug and require the drug manufacturer to
perform a costly market recall. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2018).
112. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 591 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, FDA Recalls Are a Reminder that China Controls Much of World's Drug
Supply, NBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/fdarecalls-are-reminder-china-controls-much-world-s-drug-n900716
[https://perma.cc/XHH8-6X35]
(highlighting the challenge the FDA faces in regulating a generic drug market that is "increasingly
outsourced to other countries, especially China").
114. See Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel TherapeuticsApproved by
the US Food and Drug AdministrationBetween 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854, 1855 (2017).
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warn claims,"' the effect of this generic manufacturer immunity cannot be
overstated.
In contrast, device manufacturers are largely shielded from failure-to-warn
claims through a different mechanism. Unlike drug regulation, Congress
expressly included a preemption clause for medical devices in the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976."6 In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. ,117 the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret this preemption clause in the context of a
balloon catheter intended for angioplasty.ns The Court construed 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a) to preempt any state products liability claims that conflicted with a
federal requirement imposed by the FDA.n' However, crucially, the Court in
Riegel declined to extend this protective power to all medical devices, limiting
preemption to Class III devices that have gone through the rigorous process of
PMA.120 The Court reasoned that only the stringent requirements of the PMA
process imposed a sufficient federal duty on device manufacturers to preempt
state regulations. Thus, devices approved through section 510(k), which focused
on equivalence and not on safety, would not receive protection under
§ 360k(a).121
As a result, the relative positions of innovator manufacturers and generic
manufacturers appear to invert in the medical device context. Innovators are
shielded from state tort liability while "generic" manufacturers, despite showing
equivalence to an existing FDA-approved device, are liable for not only
manufacturing defects but also design defects and failure to warn. Therefore,
generic device manufacturers that introduce products based on existing medical
devices will inevitably seek approval through section 510(k) if available and are
at a significantly higher risk of litigation than their generic-drug-manufacturer
counterparts. Given this liability and the high cost of producing medical
devices, coupled with the reduced profit margin for any generic as compared to
the brand name, there are simply insufficient incentives for manufacturers to
produce high-risk generic medical devices.

&

115. See Han W. Choi & Jae Hong Lee, PharmaceuticalProduct Liability, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 688, 696-98 (Lionel D. Edwards, Anthony W. Fox

Peter D. Stonier eds., 3d ed. 2011).
116. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C.

§ 360k(a)

(2018)) ("Except

as provided in [21 U.S.C. § 360k(b)], no State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to
a [medical device] any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.").

117.
118.
119.
120.

552 U.S. 312 (2008).
Id. at 320.
See id. at 330.
See id. at 322-23; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492 (1996) (declining to

extend § 360k(a) express preemption to devices approved through 510(k) because it "imposes no
'requirement' on the design of [the medical device]").

121. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323.
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Patentability

In contrast to products liability, in the fields of intellectual property and
patents courts have been willing to afford generic medical devices many of the
same legal protections available to generic drugs. Notably, the Supreme Court
extended patent protection, originally offered to generic drugs in the HatchWaxman Act of 1984,122 to generic medical devices in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc. 12 3
In this case, plaintiff, Eli Lilly's predecessor-in-interest, filed suit to enjoin
defendant Medtronic's testing and marketing of an implantable cardiac
defibrillator, a generic medical device for use in patients with life-threatening
cardiac arrhythmias.124 Eli Lilly argued that Medtronic's testing infringed two
of its patents.125 Medtronic argued that its activities were undertaken to develop
and submit to the government information necessary to obtain PMA for the
device under section 515 of the FDCA and were therefore exempt from a
finding of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which authorizes the
manufacture, use, or sale of a patented device "solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs." 126 However, the district court
disagreed with Medtronic, concluding that the exemption did not apply to the
development and submission of information relating to medical devices on the
basis that § 271(e)(1) only applied to generic drugs, not generic devices.127 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed.128
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit and reasoned that, taken
as a whole, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act supported Medtronic's
interpretation. 129 The Court therefore held that patent protection necessary for
premarket testing and approval should protect generic medical devices in the
same way it protects generic drugs. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
reasoned that "[i]t seems most implausible to us that Congress, being
demonstrably aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval
requirements in this entire area . . . should choose to address both those
distortions only for drug products." 13

122.
U.S.C.).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
See id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1033, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 669-74.
Id. at 672.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

618

[Vol. 9 8

Writing in dissent, Justice Kennedy argued that "the section refers only to
the actual regulation of drugs and does not exempt the testing of a medical
device from patent infringement."' He pointed out that
like medical devices, some drugs have a very high cost. Testing a
patented medical device, however, often will have greater effects on the
patent holder's rights than comparable testing of a patented drug. As
petitioner has asserted, manufacturers may test generic versions of
patented drugs, but not devices, under abbreviated procedures. These
procedures, in general, do not affect the market in a substantial manner
because manufacturers may test the drugs on a small number of subjects,
who may include healthy persons who otherwise would not buy the drug.
By contrast, as in this case, manufacturers test and market medical
devices in clinical trials on patients who would have purchased the device
from the patent holder.132
The dissent focused on the reasons why generic medical devices and generic
pharmaceuticals might not be treated the same way by Congress, but only
Justice White agreed with Justice Kennedy.' In the end, the Court affirmed
the Federal Circuit's judgment, extending patent protection to generic medical
devices.134
Eli Lilly highlights that there are instances where courts are willing to treat
generic medical devices in a manner similar to generic pharmaceuticals.
However, since generic devices still lag far behind generic drugs, despite
qualifying for similar patent protections, it is clear that more has to be done to
properly incentivize the development of generic medical devices.
D.

Effect on Market

As a result of the regulatory and legal pressures discussed above and given
the paucity of legal protections afforded to generic devices, there is currently
little incentive for manufacturers to produce high-risk generic medical devices
in a manner analogous to generic drug manufacturers. Without radical changes
to the system, there will remain limited economically efficient pathways for a
high-risk, generic Class III device to enter the market. Further buttressing the
obstacles of bringing a high-risk generic device to market would be the reduced
potential for profit from a generic medical device as compared to the innovator
device. This is in part because all Class III device manufacturers-whether they
produce an innovator device or if they were able to create a generic-exist on a

131.

Id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

132.

Id. (citations omitted).

133. Id. at 679.
134. Id. at 677-79 (majority opinion).
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level playing field with respect to products liability, in that both generic and
innovator devices receive the protection of statutory preemption."'
Indeed, due to the cost of obtaining regulatory approval for Class III
devices and the risk of liability if the device is particularly high-risk, generic
device manufacturers instead focus on low- to medium-risk medical devices that
are subject to the more expedient section 510(k) approval pathway.' Unlike
Class III devices, there is generally no federal statute that protects
manufacturers of section 510(k) devices from certain types of products liability
exposure. While these devices are, by definition, lower risk than their Class III
counterparts, their manufacturers are paradoxically subject to more products
liability risk.
This leads to a situation where the largest generic device manufacturers in
the United States do not reproduce Class III devices but instead focus on Class
I and some Class II medical devices, such as asthma inhalers.' For their part,
brand-name manufacturers have supported this trend, as the lack of generic
market participants ensures that manufacturers of Class III devices are insulated
from generic competition. However, as medical device profits and costs
continue to increase,3 there is growing significant regulatory and public
pressure for greater access to generic medical devices.
Given the regulatory obstacles for many types of Class III generics and
the ethical rationale promoting more generic devices, it is clear that an
alternative pathway for approval and preemption is needed. Fundamentally,
something needs to be done to better encourage the production of generic
medical devices. This must start with regulatory and legal changes to promote
access while also recognizing the need to better protect generic device
manufacturers from liability.
III. OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION
Based on the success of the generic drug market and the significant savings
it confers to healthcare systems and taxpayers, along with research and public
health benefits, the inherent potential of a robust generic device market is clear.
In order to improve access, it is important to try new ideas to fix long-standing

135. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 360k(a)

(2018).

136. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Greg Kemper, The Benefits of Generic Medical Devices, KEMPER MED., INC. (Sept. 14,
2015),
http://www.kempermedical.com/blog/the-benefits-of-generic-medical-devices/
[https://perma.cc/VKQ4-G46J] ("It should be noted that [Generic Medical Devices, a generic device
company,] is not focusing on highly complex devices that are considered life-critical but those that are
standard-of-care and which have undergone minimal technological innovation, making them easy to
replicate.").
138. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 5.
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problems.' We recommend two changes that would incentivize more generic
device manufacturers to enter into the market for Class III devices: (1) the FDA
should create a new abbreviated premarket approval process ("APMA")
analogous to its ANDA process that allows device manufacturers to receive
approval for medical devices by demonstrating equivalence to an existing FDAapproved medical device; and (2) courts or legislators should extend the
Mensing/Bartlett preemption doctrine to generic medical devices, similar to the
way courts interpret patent protections to apply to generic devices.
A.

The Abbreviated Premarket Approval

The FDA should create a new category of premarket approval that covers
all classes of medical devices for which a predicate FDA-approved device exists.
Changing the regulatory approval pathway is particularly important given the
documented problems in the current section 510(k) process. While a full
discussion of the shortcomings of the current section 510(k) procedure is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is important to recognize that the section 510(k)
pathway has been the subject of substantial criticism and debate.140
Indeed, in 2010, the Institute of Medicine ("1M") released a report
critiquing the section 510(k) process.141 The report emphasized the risks in
simply looking to predicate devices to determine substantial equivalence,
highlighting that such a process is unable to truly demonstrate safety or
efficacy.142 These concerns led the IOM to recommend the abolition of the
section 510(k) process for all Class II devices.143 Courts have also recognized the
shortcomings of the current section 510(k) paradigm, with Justice Stevens
writing that "[t]here is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme or the
legislative history that the § 510(k) exemption process was intended to do
anything other than maintain the status quo with respect to the marketing of
existing medical devices and their substantial equivalents."144 Given the
problems with the current section 510(k) pathway, a new paradigm, which

139. See, e.g., Zachary E. Shapiro, Savior Siblings in the United States: Ethical Conundrums, Legal and
Regulatory Void, 24 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 419, 422 (2018) (exploring the potential use of
"savior siblings" to "provid[e] biological material that can help treat or cure an existing terminally ill
child").
140. See, e.g., Fins et al., PragmaticResponse, supra note 94, at 82-86 (critiquing the 510(k) clearance
process as it applies to Class III medical devices, including deep brain stimulation electrodes).
141. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 97 (providing a
comprehensive report of the 510(k) clearance process of medical devices at the request of the FDA).
142. See id. at 127 ("Class II approvals should be based on objective performance criteria that ensure
safe and effective use, when appropriate based on comparison to predicate devices recognized as
meeting those standards.").
143. See id. at 126 (recommending that regulators should "[c]reate a class II approval process
[because t]he 510(k) procedure deserves its own home outside the historical work around of cobbling
together a 'clearance' (aka approval) process with registration and listing").
144. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996).
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differs from the section 510(k) process in key ways, would better incentivize the
safe creation and dissemination of generic medical devices.
First, the section 510(k) paradigm is not only designed for copies of
existing medical devices that do not have a new use but also for iterative changes
that do not substantially alter the safety and efficacy of existing devices.
Therefore, the testing methodologies adopted by the section 510(k) program are
targeted towards incremental improvements to existing devices. In section
510(k) parlance, "substantially equivalent" includes both devices that have the
"same technological characteristics as the predicate device" as well as devices
that have "different technological characteristics" but are "substantially
equivalent to the predicate device."1 4 5 These "different technological
characteristics" can include significant changes in the "materials, design, energy
source, or other features of the device from those of the predicate device"146 as
there is leeway in how a section 510(k) device may differ from a predicate
device. Therefore, to help ensure safety and efficacy, we propose that the
APMA define "substantial equivalence" according to § 360c, namely that the
device must have "the same technological characteristics as the predicate
device." This is equivalent to the ANDA requirement that a generic drug must
be bioequivalent to its predicate.
Of course, this would require access to technical information about the
medical device. A possible solution to this concern would be to simply require
innovator manufacturers to disclose blueprints or specifications for certain
classes of complex medical devices, information that is often already submitted
to the FDA as part of the premarket approval process.147 Currently,
manufacturers seeking either a 510(k) or PMA bear the burden of providing
manufacturing and design control data to demonstrate the safety and efficacy
of their proposed devices. Under FDA regulations, an applicant manufacturer
may reference information contained in another application with permission
from the original manufacturer that submitted the application.148 This
permission must be submitted to the FDA in a "letter of authorization"
("LOA"), which grants the applicant the right of reference to relevant
information contained in the original manufacturer's device master files
("MAF").149 Currently, the process by which manufacturers provide or decline

145. 21 U.S.C.

§ 360c(i)(1)(A)

(2018).

146. Id. § 360c(i)(1)(B).
147. See Master Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/premarket-approval-pma/master-files [https://perma.cc/9F9E-JDBR].
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., id. (explaining the authorization process and providing an example of a letter of
authorization).
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to provide LOAs lacks transparency since the manufacturers, unlike the FDA,
are not subject to transparency laws such as the Freedom of Information Act. 150
In addition to these concerns, a manufacturer would be strongly
disincentivized (1) to release potentially confidential or trade secret information
contained in the MAF or (2) to provide a right of reference to a potential
generic competitor. This is why countervailing market forces associated with
generic medical devices are especially important to help incentivize
participation by industry. Analogies abound to the generic drug marketplace,
where brand-name manufacturers have developed a slew of tactics to slow the
introduction of generic drugs.151 Accepting the potential merit of such a
suggestion, a more critical element would be to incorporate transfer of the MAF
into such a recommendation for a novel generic medical device pathway. As
part of the PMA, a device manufacturer should agree to allow the FDA to
release MAFs to follow-on generic manufacturers. In turn, the FDA can
indemnify the device manufacturer (i.e., pay a fair royalty for the generic
manufacturer's use of the MAFs) through its User Fee Program and pass on
some, or all, of the costs to generic manufacturers. 152
Currently, the section 510(k) paradigm applies only to Class I and certain
Class II devices. Devices requiring a PMA are not eligible predicate devices
under section 510(k). Since the APMA will be designed for devices with
identical characteristics to predicate devices, there is no concern that generic
manufacturers will introduce design changes altering the safety and efficacy of
their generic devices. Therefore, the APMA should be available for substantial
equivalents of all classes of medical devices. This change is key to allowing
generic device manufacturers to participate in all levels of the medical device
market, particularly in incentivizing generic device manufacturers to create
higher-risk devices.
Finally, the APMA would follow similar labeling standards to the ANDA.
Under the APMA, generic device manufacturers would be required to submit a
proposed label that contains the same information as the predicate device and
would be required to update their labels following any changes to the label for
the predicate device.

150. See Michael L. Kelly et al., Barriers to Investigator-InitiatedDeep Brain Stimulation and Device
Research, 82 NEUROLOGY 1465, 1467 (2014) ("The criteria by which manufacturers process outside
requests for right of reference authorization are underreported.").
151. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Payingfor Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (discussing reverse patent payment settlement or
"pay-for-delay" schemes to delay generic drugs); Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat,
Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An EmpiricalAnalysis of 'Secondary' PharmaceuticalPatents,
PLOS ONE, Dec. 5, 2012, at 2 (discussing "evergreening" of drug patents to prevent the entry of
generic competitors).
152. FDA User Fee Programs, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/default.htm [https://perma.cc/FT6P-FMSJ].
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Some aspects of the ANDA process, however, cannot be directly applied
to the device context. Unlike drugs, medical devices can sometimes vary in
material, composition, or design without a corresponding change in therapeutic
function. For example, the choice of material for a printed circuit board
("PCB") in a cardiac pacemaker would almost certainly not make a difference
in the safety or function of the pacemaker, since the PCB does not need to be
made of biocompatible materials, as long as the PCB is enclosed in the
pacemaker's biocompatible casing. This is akin to when generic drug
manufacturers use differing manufacturing processes or reagents to create
generic drug equivalents of innovator drugs.
A close analogue to the device model exists in the regulatory approval of
biosimilars and interchangeable products. Biosimilars and interchangeable
products are a relatively new class of biological products introduced in the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, which was integrated
as Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.' Unlike
nonbiological drugs, biological products-or biologics-are typically very large
molecules derived from human, animal, or microorganism sources. 154 For
example, vaccines are a type of biologic. According to the FDA, "[i]n contrast
to most drugs that are chemically synthesized and their structure is known, most
biologics are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized."1 55
It is possible for chemical or steric variations of a biologic to achieve the same
therapeutic effect. Thus, the generic pathway for biologics includes not only
exact replicas of a biologic, but also similar biologics (i.e., "biosimilars").
Unlike the ANDA, the biosimilar approval pathway accepts two tiers of
biosimilars. The higher standard, called "interchangeable" biologics, closely
mirrors the ANDA requirement for generics: a manufacturer must meet a
rigorous standard of proof that the proposed biosimilar will "be expected to
produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient. "156
Furthermore, "the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating
or switching between use of the [biosimilar] and the reference product [must
not be] greater than the risk of using the reference product without such
15
alternation or switching."m
Under the lower standard, a biologic may also be
approved as a biosimilar-but not interchangeable-product if the

153. Pub. L. No. 111-148,
(2018)).

§§

7001-7003,124 Stat. 804, 804-21 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

154. U.S.
FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Biological-Product-Definitions.pdf

§ 262

DEFINITIONS

1,

[https://perma.cc/NJ5Y-5LFP].
155. What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucml

33077.htm [https://perma.cc/VWA8-Z44R].
156. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii) (2018).
157. Id. § 262(k)(4)(B).
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manufacturer provides proof that the biological product is "highly similar to the
reference product notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive
components; and there are no clinically meaningful differences between the
biological product and the reference product in terms of safety, purity, and
potency of the product."' The statutory requirements under the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 are strikingly similar to the
statutory requirements of section 510(k), which requires a device to be
"substantially equivalent" to a predicate device. 15
We believe that the FDA model for biosimilar applications could be
translated to generic medical devices to great effect. Like biosimilars, the FDA
can create two tiers of review for the APMA: a lower tier in which a
manufacturer must provide scientific or clinical evidence that demonstrates that
the proposed device has no clinically meaningful difference compared to the
predicate and a higher tier in which a manufacturer must meet the evidentiary
burden that the proposed device is clinically interchangeable with the predicate.
This system strengthens the FDA approval pathway for devices by allowing
generic device manufacturers to enjoy expedited approvals while limiting the
amount of misuse by manufacturers for predicate creep. Thus, innovator
manufacturers would be encouraged to innovate, while generic manufacturers
would be confident in using tried-and-true device designs. In this way, generic
devices could finally be properly incentivized from a regulatory approval
perspective.
By narrowing the focus of the approval process, the APMA process would
likely be substantially simpler than the current section 510(k) paradigm while
ameliorating some of the criticisms of the section 510(k) pathway discussed
above. A simple, streamlined process under the APMA would reduce
transaction costs and shorten approval times, resulting in a reduction of
administrative burden to the FDA. A new regulatory approval pathway thus
would not only benefit patients and the healthcare system in general but would
also be beneficial to manufacturers and the FDA.
B.

Extending Generic Drug Preemption Doctrine to Generic Medical Devices

Just as courts have extended patent protection available to generic drugs
to generic medical devices, we propose that courts definitively extend
impossibility preemption under the Mensing/Bartlett standard to the field of
medical devices. Courts should rule that device manufacturers who submit
through the proposed APMA and certain section 510(k) pathways would not be
able to independently comply with both FDA regulations and state duty-towarn laws. This would harmonize drug product and medical device liability and
158. Id. § 262(i)(2)(A)-(B).
159. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2018).
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remove a major liability that generic device manufacturers currently bear.
Importantly, and most critically, federal preemption will not shield generic
manufacturers from state-law tort claims concerning manufacturing defects.
Under our proposal, it is undeniable that patients seeking to recover damages
from generic devices manufacturers would face an uphill battle. However, we
posit that such policies would have a net positive effect on society as they would
incentivize manufacturers to create generic devices, resulting in greater access
to medical devices and a reduction in costs to the healthcare system as a whole
while still allowing patients harmed by a generic device a legal mechanism to
recover damages.
The legal analysis for applying Mensing/Bartlett to the APMA is
straightforward, but the application of impossibility preemption to section
510(k) devices warrants additional analysis. First, under section 510(k), any
major modification-including a label change-to device design that "could
significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device" must be submitted
to the FDA before a manufacturer can enact a change."'o Second, any products
liability action brought under the risk-utility approach would require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the device manufacturer could have "either
increase[ed] the 'usefulness' of [the] products or reduce[d] its 'risk of danger.'"'6
In essence, a plaintiff would have to prove that "redesign" of the device was
possible.162 But if such a redesign occurred, then the device would no longer be
a generic and should lose associated preemption flowing from the predicate
device.' Therefore, a manufacturer is statutorily barred from the "unilateral"
action that the court in Mensing deemed necessary to defeat impossibility
preemption.164 Thus, even under our current preemption doctrine, generic
device manufacturers may theoretically raise a preemption defense against state
products liability claims.
However, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr'6 5 when it held that neither "the statutory scheme or legislative
history [suggests] that the section 510(k) exemption process was intended to do
anything other than maintain the status quo," which included the possibility
that a medical device manufacturer would have to defend itself against state-

160. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a)(3)(i) (2019).
161. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 483 (2013).
162. See id.
163. Previously, one author of this Article argued that predicate approvals, under the HDE, should
be waived if an approved device is being used for a different purpose. See, e.g., Fins et al., Misuse of
HDE, supra note 92, at 308 (critiquing the use of an approved DBS stimulator device, approved for
Parkinson's disease, for obsessive-compulsive disorder).
164. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 614 (2011) ("[C]hanges unilaterally made to
strengthen a generic drug's warning label would violate the statutes and regulations requiring a generic
drug's label to match its brand-name counterpart's.").

165. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).

626

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9 8

'

law negligent design claims.' The Court's holding in Lohr is limited to the
express preemption clause under § 360k as opposed to the general doctrine of
impossibility preemption. 6 ' In particular, the Court's decision turned on
whether section 510(k) imposed "federal requirements" as defined under
§ 360k. 6 ' Thus, the issue of impossibility preemption remains a plausible
avenue for preemption, but an abundance of lower court decisions suggests that
courts are unwilling to disturb the established broad interpretation of Lohr. 6
While the example of Eli Lilly shows that courts may be willing to protect
generic devices on their own, relying on judges to fashion a remedy to
incentivize generic devices is risky. This would require a case with the right set
of circumstances, heard before a jurist who understands the issues at stake,
combined with excellent lawyering and advocacy to make sure that the best
arguments are put forward. In litigation, there would be significant resistance
from current brand-name device manufacturers, and the adversarial nature of a
trial muddies the water. Even if a court decided to extend preemption doctrine
to generic medical devices, the decision could ultimately be overturned on
appeal or reversed later and therefore would not provide the certainty and
clarity necessary for device manufacturers to undertake the significant financial
commitments needed to produce generic medical devices. A serious question
would still remain concerning whether such a ruling would be within the proper
scope of the judiciary, which would be engaging in de facto policymaking in the
field of public health.
For these reasons, legislation specifically concerning generic devices would
provide the best form of protection. The specific form of this legislation would
depend on whether the APMA process is codified. Even if Congress codifies
the APMA process, § 360k may not necessarily extend to all generic medical
devices, as it is unclear if the APMA process would impose "requirements"
under the statute.
Thus, Congress may take this opportunity to include express language that
specifies the extent of state-law liability for generic medical devices, as well as
generic drugs and biosimilars. This type of legislation could have the added

166. Id. at 494; cf Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322-23 (2008) (contrasting the PMA
process and the 510(k) process).
167. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 484 ("[W]e are presented with the task of interpreting a statutory provision
that expressly pre-empts state law.").
168. Id. at 493-94 (finding that the 510(k) process did not "require [defendant's device] to take
any particular form for any particular reason").
169. See, e.g., In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 15-02641-PHX DGC, 2017 WL
5625547, at *14 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 2017) (rejecting an impossibility preemption defense to a state-law
failure-to-warn claim based on section 510(k)); Mullins v. Ethicon, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 478, 482 (S.D.
W. Va. 2015) ("[D]efendants have not demonstrated that it was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to immunize medical device makers from state tort liability, and so have not overcome the
presumption against preemption." (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485)).
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benefit of harmonizing the legal and regulatory pathways for devices, drugs, and
biosimilars. Legislation could end up addressing potential shortcomings in the
federal common law, as well as clarifying Congress's stance on whether federal
preemption should extend to biosimilar products. For example, Congress may
decide that while generic manufacturers should be protected from some tort
claims, said liability protection should be conditioned on the manufacturer's
cooperation with the regulatory scheme (e.g., promptly submitting safety data)
or only apply when the public interest for a device outweighs the public harm
of restricting state tort liability (e.g., devices used to treat rare diseases).
Congress may also elect to extend limited forms of protection to device
manufacturers participating in the section 510(k) process. Congress may either
amend § 360k such that section 510(k) is considered a "federal requirement" or,
alternatively, implement changes to the section 510(k) process itself that would
impose a requirement if certain conditions were met. For example, protection
may be extended to manufacturers who agree to participate in additional
postapproval safety data-gathering programs."
Considering and passing proper legislation would enable Congress to
properly weigh the evidence, hear from a variety of stakeholders, devise proper
checks and balances between generic and innovator devices, and chart the best
course forward. Despite the current political gridlock, we are confident that, if
Congress seriously considered the status and potential of generic medical
devices, it could devise an effective policy to protect and promote generic
medical devices.171
CONCLUSION
The success of generic pharmaceuticals has provided a glimpse of the
benefits that generic medical devices might bring. However, several legal and
regulatory barriers must be overcome before a generic device marketplace can
be realized. While generic drug reform such as the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
Supreme Court's decisions in Mensing and Bartlett provide some guidance for
the first steps towards a generic device marketplace, several challenges unique
to medical devices remain. First, federal statutes and regulations do not
contemplate generic devices at all. The current paradigm for follow-on medical
170. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE UNDER SECTION 522 OF
THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4-5 (May 16, 2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm268141.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/F6AM-KGQA] (outlining a potential postmarket surveillance program to monitor
the safety and efficacy Class II and III devices).
171. See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Senate Finance Committee Unveils Bipartisan Bill To Lower

PrescriptionDrug Pricesfor Seniors, CNBC (July 23, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/23/
key-senate-panel-unveils-bipartisan-bill-to-lower-drug-prices-for-seniors.html

L4BZ-VC2Y].

[https://perma.cc/
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device approval prioritizes iterative changes and does not reward equivalency
in safety and efficacy. Second, unlike innovator drug manufacturers, innovator
device manufacturers are able to protect their device designs despite being
required to submit this information to the FDA. Third, generic device
manufacturers tend to receive less legal protection from products liability suits
than innovator device manufacturers, an inversion of the state of products
liability in the generic drug marketplace, despite qualifying for similar patent
protections.
The current design of the regulatory and legal regime heavily disfavors the
entry of generic device manufacturers. Without reform, patients will continue
to be forced to purchase medical devices from a marketplace without the benefit
of generic competition. In a recent statement, the FDA emphasized the
importance of promoting generic drug competition to "complex drugs."172
Noting that complex drugs "continue to face no generic competition" because
they are hard to "genericize," the FDA plans to advance policies to promote
generic competition."' Many of the proposed policies, such as guidance for
"develop[ing] complex drugs that are hard to copy," "establishing active
ingredient sameness," and creating "new analytical tools" to support generic
approval, would also be effective in promoting the development of generic
medical devices.174
However, without changes to the regulatory and legal systems described
above, generic medical devices will continue to lag behind their pharmaceutical
counterparts. The creation of a generic device marketplace strongly aligns with
the FDA's mission to promote patient access to innovative therapies, whatever
form they take. It is our hope that the above observations and recommendations
will shift the balance towards generic medical devices, thus expanding access to
innovative and cost-conscious therapies.

172. Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement -on 2019 Efforts To
Advance the Development of Complex Generics To Improve Patient Access to Medicines (Jan. 30,
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm630160.htm.
2019),

[https://perma.cc/F6AM-KGQA].
173. Id.
174. Id.

